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NOTES

KRAUS V. NEW ROCHELLE HOSP. MEDICAL
CTR.: ARE WHISTLEBLOWERS FINALLY

GETTING THE PROTECTION THEY NEED?
INTRODUCTION

The term "whistleblower" is apparently derived from the act of
English bobbies (policemen) blowing their whistles, upon becoming
aware of the commission of a crime, to alert the general public and
other law enforcement officials within the zone of danger about the

criminal act.' To many, however, the word "whistleblower" represents heroes who risk their lives or careers for the benefit of society.2 On the other hand, critics perceive them to be nothing short of
"tattletales," "snitches," or "industrial spies" who toss out employee

loyalty for furtherance of their own political, ethical, moral, or personal agendas. 3 Whether considered a valued protector of society or
simply a self motivated stool pigeon, a whistleblower is defined as
someone "who, believing that the public interest overrides the interest of the organization he serves, publicly 'blows the whistle' if the
organization is involved in corrupt, illegal, fraudulent, or harmful
activity."4
1. Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 727 (Tex. 1990)
(Doggett, J., concurring) (citing BLOWING THE WHISTLE 18 (Charles Peters & Taylor Branch
eds., 1972)). Modem day analogies to the whistleblower include: a referee blowing the whistle to enforce the rules of the game; a police officer blowing the whistle to direct traffic; a
lifeguard blowing the whistle to direct swimmers; and a foreman blowing the whistle to
communicate to the workers. Kent D. Strader, Comment, Counterclaims Against
Whistleblowers: Should Counterclaims Against Qui Tam Plaintiffs be Allowed in False Claims
Act Cases?, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 713, 764 (1993).
2. See generally Bruce D. Fisher, The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: A False
Hope for Whistleblowers, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 355 (1991).
3. See generally DANIEL P. WESTMAN, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF RETALIATORY
DISCHARGE (1991).
4. Lois A. Lofgren, Comment, Whistleblower Protection: Should Legislatures and the
Courts Provide a Shelter to Public and Private Sector Employees Who Disclose the Wrongdoing of Employers?, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 316, 316 (1993) (quoting RALPH NADER ET
AL., WHISTLEBLOWING: THE REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

vii (1972)).
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If the "whistle" is blown, the employees who speak out risk not
only retaliation by their employers but also devastation of their careers.' Retaliation may be in the form of a demotion, co-worker harassment, denial of advancement, or termination.6 Employers rationalize this harsh treatment of whistleblowers by claiming that discharge is necessary to enforce employee loyalty, to avoid disruptions
of employee morale, to preserve internal company security and procedures, or to avoid public embarrassment of the employer! In addition to the very real possibility that whistleblowers may lose their
jobs, prospective employers may fear hiring whistleblowers, which
could make a known whistleblower practically unhirable' Considering these possible consequences of whisfleblowing, a potential
whistleblower must sincerely believe that the protection of society
from wrongdoing is paramount to any other personal considerations
including the loss of one's career.9
Until recently, whistleblowers had no legal recourse for enduring
the consequences of whistleblowing.'I Over the last few decades,
however, whistleblower protection laws have been passed by Congress as well as a majority of the state legislatures."'
Part I of this note focuses on the history and intent of New
York's whistleblower statute. 2 Part II dissects New York's statutory
whistleblower protection and examines relevant case law. Part 1I
explores the first victory for whistleblowers under the New York
Whistleblower Statute. Part IV presents an overview of other states'
whistleblower statutes.
Part V explores the problems with New York's whistleblower
statute, including possible amendments to broaden the statute's otherwise limited protection. Although New York was one of the first
jurisdictions to enact a whistleblower statute," its protection of

5. Lofgren. supra note 4, at 317. For a complete discussion of psychological, social,
and economic considerations involving a whistleblower's decision, see generally MARCIA P.
MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BiowiNG THE WHSTLE: THE ORGANIZATIONAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPANIES AND EMPLOYEES (1992).
6. Lofgren, supra note 4, at 180.
7. Martin H. Malin, Protecting the Whistleblower from Retaliatory Discharge, 16 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 277, 280 (1983).
8. Lofgren, supra note 4, at 317.
9. Lofgren, supra note 4, at 317.
10. Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405 (1967).
11. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
12. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1994).
13. Id. For example, this section - enacted in 1984 - deals with private sector em-
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whistleblowers is severely limited.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND INTENT

Protection for whistleblowers commenced only a little over a
decade ago. In 1982, the New York State Assembly passed a
whistleblower protection bill, but it failed to gain State Senate approval. 4 In early 1983, a whistleblower bill was reintroduced in the
New York State Legislature; this proposed bill provided greater
protection to private sector employees than the statute finally enacted. 5 Both the standing law and the 1983 proposed bill included
protection for whistleblowers who disclose "to a supervisory authority or to a public body an activity, policy, or practice of the employer that the employee reasonably believes to be a violation of law or
regulation, or that the employee reasonably believes poses a substantial and impending danger to public health or safety."16 However,
the 1983 proposed bill offered protection to private sector employees
who (1) provided information to, testified before, or otherwise cooperated with a public body conducting an investigation, hearing or
inquiry with respect to any violation of law, rule or regulation; and
(2) refused to participate in, or otherwise objected to, conduct which
the employee reasonably believed either involved a violation of law,
rule, regulation, or posed a substantial and impending danger to
public health or safety.' 7 In addition, the proposed 1983 bill contained a provision allowing an employee to disclose to the media
situations presenting a serious imminent threat to human health or
safety, where disclosure to a government body had already been
made, and where that body had failed to take appropriate action
within a reasonable time. Although the bill was passed by the State
Assembly, it never became law. 8
Yet another bill which failed to become law 9 involved protec-

ployees only. Id.
14. See A.12451 (1982) (New York State Assembly whistleblower protection bill);
S.9566 (1982) (New York State Senate whistleblower protection bill); see also Joseph
DeGiuseppe, The Recognition of Public Policy Exceptions to the Employment-at-Will Rule: A
Legislative Function?, 11 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 721, 738 n.89 (1983).
15. See S.1153 (1983) (New York State Senate whistleblower protection bill), A.2126
(1983) (New York State Assembly whistleblower protection bill); see also DeGiuseppe, supra
note 14, at 738 n.89.
16. DeGiuseppe, supra note 14, at 738 n.89.
17. DeGiuseppe, supra note 14, at 738 n.89.
18. DeGiuseppe, supra note 14, at 738 n.89.
19. The bill, although passed by the legislature, was not signed into law by the gover-
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tion of certain licensed professional employees against retaliatory

discharges or other punitive action for refusing to engage in professional misconduct.2'
While the New York State Legislature was considering several
types of statutory protections for at-will employees, 2' the New York
Court of Appeals, New York's highest court, in Murphy v. American
Home Products Corp.,' declined to recognize whistleblower protection under the common law, stating that "such recognition must

await action of the Legislature."a' In Murphy, the plaintiff, a fiftynine year-old assistant treasurer and accountant, was allegedly dis-

missed in retaliation for reporting the defendant-employer's improprieties to its officers and directors.24 Murphy also alleged that he was

dismissed in retaliation for his refusal to personally engage in the
alleged accounting improprieties.' Despite the plaintiff's persuasive
arguments, the Court of Appeals dismissed the cause of action, stating "that such a significant change in our law is best left to the
26
Legislature.
The goal of New York Labor Law § 740, the current
whistleblower statute, is to encourage those at the working level to
report hazards, improprieties and wrongdoings to supervisors, and if

necessary, to public authorities.27 The provision, if it works as in-

nor. DeGiuseppe, supra note 14, at 738 n.89.
20. For a definition of professional misconduct, see N.Y. EDuc. LAW §§ 6509, 6509-a
(McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1994).
21. The employment-at-will doctrine provides that, absent an express agreement to contrary, either employer or employee may terminate their relationship at any time, for any reason. This employment relationship has no specific duration, and may be terminated at will by
either the employee or the employer, for or without cause. BLACKS'S LAW DICTIoNARY 525
(6th ed. 1990). See also Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 506 N.E.2d 919 (N.Y. 1987).
22. 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983).
23. l at 87.
24. This reporting was required by internal company regulations. Specifically, plaintiff
reported "that he had uncovered at least $50 million in illegal account manipulations of secret
pension reserves which improperly inflated the company's growth in income and allowed
high-ranking officers to reap unwarranted bonuses from a management incentive plan." Id.
25. Il
26. Id. at 89. The court reasoned that the New York State Legislature had "infinitely
greater resources and procedural means to discern the public will, to examine the variety of
pertinent considerations, to elicit the views of various segments of the community that would
be directly affected . . . , and to investigate and anticipate the impact of imposition of such
liability," and was best suited to determine if such a significant change was appropriate. The
court also noted that proposed whistleblower legislation was then pending before the legislature. Id. at 89-90.
27. Richard A. Givens, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 545, 546
(McKinney 1988).
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tended, "would help to offset somewhat the frequent tendency of
layers within organizations to screen out information which might
cause embarrassment if [that information] reached the top of the
organization or the outside."' Despite this praiseworthy goal, this
statute completely fails to provide the protection whistleblowing
employees deserve. 9 Whistleblowers "risk their lives and careers for
the public good"; therefore, they must be ensured protection."
IH. NEW YORK'S WHISTLEBLOWER STATUTE
In 1984, New York State Governor Cuomo signed into law
what is commonly known as New York's Whistleblower Statute. 1
This law created an express statutory exception to the employment
at-will rule for the purpose of encouraging employees to report illegal practices without fear of reprisal." The private sector protection,
effectuated on September 1, 1984, provides in relevant part:
2. Prohibitions. An employer shall not take any retaliatory personnel
action against an employee because such employee does any of the
following:
(a) discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a
public body an activity, policy or practice of the employer that is in
violation of law, rule or regulation which violation creates and presents a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety;
(b) provides information to, or testifies before, any public body
conducting an investigation, hearing or inquiry into any such violation of a law, rule or regulation by such employer; or
(c) objects to, or refuses to participate in any such activity,
policy or practice in violation of a law, rule or regulation.33
The statute defines "retaliatory personnel action" broadly to in-

28. Id.
29. Gary Minda, Employment Law, 41 SYRACUSE L. REv. 265, 276 (1990).
30. Lofgren, supra note 4, at 316.
31. This law is entitled "Retaliatory Personnel Action by Employers." N.Y. LAB. LAW §
740 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1994). See also N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 75(b) (McKinney
Supp. 1990) (this law forbids retaliatory action by public employers). N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW
§ 75(b) is a broader statute; it affords more protection to employees than N.Y. LAB. LAW §
740. This note will not address the issue of retaliatory firing of a public employee.
Legislative history indicates that this final bill was the result of a merger of a public
employee bill proposed by Governor Cuomo in January 1984 and a revised version of the
1983 Assembly bill; see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
32. Minda, supra note 29, at 276.
33. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2) (McKinney 1988).
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lude "the discharge, suspension or demotion of an employee, or
other adverse employment action taken against an employee in the
terms and conditions of employment."' However, the severe limits
imposed by the Legislature have curtailed the implementation of this
statute by providing that the protection against "retaliatory personnel
action" will only apply in cases where an employee has brought the
"violation of law, rule or regulation to the attention of a supervisor of
the employer and has afforded such employer a reasonable opportunity to correct [the] activity, policy or practice" that is the subject of
the employee's complaint. 5
In addition to the above limitation, the statute includes a daunting deterrent to employees contemplating bringing suit against employers for "retaliatory personnel action"; the statute includes a provision which allows for the awarding of attorneys' fees and court costs
against the employee-plaintiff "if the court determines that an action
brought by an employee under [§ 740] was without basis in law or in
fact."3' The effectiveness of the statute must be questioned when
employees' good faith reporting of employers' illegal or unsafe practices may be punished by the awarding of attorneys' fees and court
costs against them.
Further proof of § 740's narrow application may be found in
comments contained in the Act's Bill Jacket, which state that § 740
"protects public and private employees only in situations where disclosures of violations of law, rule or regulation" would prevent adverse effects to the public health and safety.37 Similarly, the New
York State Attorney General's Memorandum discussing the application of § 740 states: "[tihe bill is intended to protect employees who
disclose to governmental authorities information about, or refuse to
engage in, employer wrongdoing which is dangerous, unsafe or inimical to the public welfare."38

34. Id. § 740(1)(e).
35. Id. § 740(3).
36. Id § 740(6).
37. Bill Jacket, S.10074 (1984) (quoted in Remba v. Federation Employment & Guidance
Sent., 545 N.Y.S.2d 140, 142 (App. Div. 1989), affid, 559 N.E.2d 655 (N.Y. 1990)). For a
discussion of Remba, see infra text accompanying notes 66-69.
38. Attorney General's Memorandum, S.10074 (1984) (quoted in Remba, 545 N.Y.S.2d at
142). The Attorney General's Memorandum further provides an example of conduct that
would not, in his opinion, come within the purview of the law:
This bill, however, does not clearly protect all "whistleblower" employees. It is
unclear whether the bill would, in all situations, provide a remedy for employees
who refuse to engage in or who reveal illegal financial or accounting practices,
such as filing false tax returns on the employers behalf. If we are ever to make a
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Because of the statute's express limitations, it fails to protect an
employee who reports a suspected violation of the law which the
employee "reasonably believes" to be unlawful but which is later
found to be legal. The statute further fails to protect employees who
report actual violations of law that do not meet the "substantial and
specific danger to the public health or safety" test. 9
The difficulties in asserting a viable claim under New York's
whistleblower statute become magnified upon examination of specific
sections of the statute. In particular, problems arise when potential
claimants try to fall within the narrow scope of the statute's requirement that the violation must create a substantial and specific danger
to public health or safety, that there must be notice to the employer
of the violation, or that an "actual" violation of law, rule or regulation, rather than a reasonable belief that a wrongdoing, has occurred.' °
A. The "Actual" Violation Requirement
The New York whistleblower statute's requirement that there be
an "actual" violation of law, rule or regulation, rather than a good
faith belief that there has been a violation, presents too harsh a standard to meet. This standard leaves an employee who reports a situation that falls short of an actual illegality unprotected from retaliation.4
In Kern v. DePaul Mental Health Serv.,42 for example, the
plaintiff, a part-time resident aide at a residence for mentally handicapped individuals, alleged a male resident of the facility engaged in
nonconsensual intercourse with another resident under circumstances
that appeared to be rape.43 The plaintiff alleged that she was terminated by the hospital for whistleblowing when she reported the matter

dent in the wide-spread abuses known as "white collar" crime, employees who
disclose such illegal practices must be confident that they, too, will be protected. I
urge that this defect in the bill be cured by future legislation. Nevertheless, this
bill is a critical first step and for the reasons stated, I urge its approval.
Remba, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
39. Remba, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 141.
40. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(a) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1994).
41. See generally John D. Feerick, Toward a Model Whistleblowing Law, 10 FORDHAM
URB. L.. 585 (1992).
42. 529 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
43. Id. at 266.
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to the district attorney's office."
The court chose to interpret the whistleblower statute to mean
that the mere "belief on the part of the employee that a violation has
occurred is not sufficient to invoke the statute's protection."4 Thus,
although the employee had acted in good faith and disclosed the
conditions at the hospital with the risk of retaliation, the facts did not
demonstrate an "actual" violation of law.' Consequently, the plaintiff
was unable to invoke the protection of the statute. 47
In Connolly v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 48 the First Department of the Appellate Division of New York likewise held that
plaintiffs must establish an "actual" violation of law, rule or regulation in order to maintain a cause of action.49 In Connolly, the plaintiff alleged that she was dismissed in response to notifying management that a building manager's "erratically violent" behavior posed a
danger to tenants in the building." The court held that the plaintiff
failed to delineate a violated law and reversed the trial court's denial
of the defendant's motion to dismiss."
Similarly, other New York courts have held that an "actual"
violation must be alleged in order for a plaintiff to maintain this
cause of action. In Bellingham v. Symbol Technologies,52 the court
ruled that a plaintiff failed to properly plead a cause of action because the record did not reveal "any reasonable investigation by the
plaintiff premised on an actual violation of law."53
Many claimants have been left unprotected as a result of the
New York courts' strict interpretation of the statute's requirement of
an "actual" violation. This signals to potential whistleblowers that
their good faith belief of a wrongdoing may be inadequate unless an
unquestionable violation of law, rule or regulation has occurred. Because of this, many potential whistleblowers will opt not to blow the

44. Id.
45. Id. at 267 (emphasis omitted).
46. The court made the finding that the intercourse was consensual, did not violate any
law, and granted summary judgement. Id. at 268.
47. Id.
48. 555 N.Y.S.2d 790 (App. Div. 1990).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 792.
51. By construing the statute narrowly, the court once again made it difficult for the
plaintiff to establish a claim. Id.
52. N.Y. LJ., Dec. 12, 1989, at 21 (Sup. Ct. 1989).

53.

While the court agreed that sexual harassment is a violation of law sufficient to

invoke the protection of § 740, it found the record did not contain the "actual" violation. Id.
at 25.
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whistle for fear that they will not be protected under this statute. The
strict "actual" violation requirement demands that whistleblowers be
able to determine whether an actual violation of law occurred prior to
coming forward with information. Many whistleblowers may not be
able to draw that legal conclusion.
B. Notice to Supervisor Requirement
A plaintiff is prevented from successfully asserting a cause of
action unless the disclosure for which he or she allegedly was fired
was brought to the attention of a supervisor before the employee
made any public disclosure.5' In addition, a whistleblower must have
given the employer a reasonable opportunity to correct the situation
before making any public disclosure."
If the purpose behind the statute is to protect the public from
these illegal activities,56 what is the reasoning for keeping these
problems in-house? While giving employers the opportunity to correct
problems rather than risk public embarrassment seems both compelling and honorable, it also affords them ample time to cover up any
wrongdoing or, if necessary, terminate the whistleblower 7 Employees are stripped of any anonymity when they are required to bring
the incriminating information before their supervisors.58 Not only
does this requirement serve to deter whistleblowers from coming
forward, but absent such notification to a supervisor, they will not be
protected by the statute.59
Since the goal of this statute is to restrict employers from their
frequent tendency to shield potentially damaging information from the
public, commentators have argued that it is not wise to place the
undue burden on the whistleblower of notifying the supervisor before
public disclosure.' Another difficulty with the notice requirement is
that the whistleblower's report may never amount to anything more
than an initial report; however, it could potentially lead to that person
being branded as a disloyal employee or ostracized by fellow co-

54. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(3) (McKinney 1988).
55. Id.
56. See generally Feerick, supra note 41, at 592.
57. See Gary Minda & Katie R. Raab, Time for An Unjust Dismissal Statute in New
York 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1137, 1141 (1989).
58. See Feerick, supra note 41, at 592.
59. See Feerick, supra note 41, at 592.
60. See, e.g., Givens, supra note 27, at 546-47.
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workers, thus creating a work environment that is unbearable.6 Simply put, the notice to supervisor requirement subjects the
whistleblower to a double-edged sword: either remain silent and suffer
internal harm, or report a suspected violation and endure unknown
risks and retaliations.
C. The Substantial and Specific Danger to the Public
Health and Safety Requirement
The protection offered under New York's whistleblower statute is
also limited to those who report a violation that "creates and presents
a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety."'62
This narrow provision of the statute affords no protection to
whistleblowers who reveal other significant abuses such as breach of
fiduciary duty, intentional mismanagement, ethical or legal violations
by employers, or any abuses that do not violate the "substantial and
specific danger to public health or safety" requirement.63 Furthermore, some courts have even imposed the additional requirement that
there be more than a single close-ended isolated incident in this provision.6' Such a requirement would further dilute the protection of
whistleblowers under the statute.65
A number of appellate and lower court decisions illustrate the
reluctance of courts to find that adequately alleged violations of law,
rules, or regulations, create a substantial and specific danger to public
health or safety. For example, in Remba v. FederationEmployment &
Guidance Serv.,' the plaintiff alleged that her employer fraudulently
billed New York City for job placements that were never performed
and that she was fired because of her objection and unwillingness to
participate in the scheme.67 The First Department held that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief because her allegations of fraudulent
billing failed to establish a substantial and specific danger to the
public health or safety.6" However, since the employer's alleged

61. Lofgren, supra note 4, at 317.
62. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(a) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1994).
63. See Givens, supra note 27, at 554; N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(a) (McKinney 1988 &
Supp. 1994).
64. Givens, supra note 27, at 554.
65. Givens, supra note 27, at 554.
66. 545 N.Y.S.2d 140 (App. Div. 1989), aff'd mem., 559 N.E.2d 655 (N.Y. 1990).
67. Id.at 141.
68. Id. at 143. The dissent contended that the plaintiff should have been afforded an
opportunity to show, through discovery and other procedures, how this alleged violation of
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fraudulent billing involved illegal and harmful acts directly against the
City government, the dissent opined that it "directly affected the interests of the public and may well be construed as adversely affecting
the public health and safety within the statutory context."69
The Supreme Court of New York County reached a similar
decision in Vella v. United Cerebral Palsy, Inc.7" In Vella, the plaintiff alleged that he was terminated from employment after eleven
years of excellent performance because he reported violations of the
Not-For-Profit Corporation Law.7' The alleged violations by the de-

fendant, who was receiving and expending public moneys, included
an overpayment being made towards the purchase of specially designed plumbing fixtures for the United Cerebral Palsy facilities.72
The plaintiff's complaint was dismissed because the alleged violation,
even though it related to plumbing facilities needed to specifically

accommodate the needs of handicapped people, did not in and of
itself constitute a
health.73
The allegations
Leumi Trust Co.'
and specific danger

substantial and specific danger to the public
of retaliatory firing asserted in Leibowitz v. Bank
also failed to establish the requisite substantial
to the public health or safety.75 The Second De-

law was directly related to the public interest the statute is meant to protect. Id. at 146
(Ellerin, J., dissenting).
The dissent grounded its argument, in large part, on the premise that the intended goal
of the whistleblower law was to prohibit employers from firing at-will employees for reasons
"contrary to public policy" and that the instant case fell into this category. Id. The majority
dismissed this argument, stating in a footnote that "[s]uch an argument ignores the codification of the public policy, as set forth in Labor Law § 740(2)(a), which requires a showing
that the violation of law 'creates and presents a substantial and specific danger to the public
health or safety."' Id. at 142 n.1.
69. Id. at 146 (Ellerin, J., dissenting).
70. 535 N.Y.S.2d 292 (Sup. CL 1988).
71. Id. at 293.

72. Id. at 293-94. The law alleged to have been violated, N.Y.

NoT-FoR-PRoFrr CORP.

LAW § 717(a) (McKinney 1988), was not considered to be a violation that posed a danger to
the public health and safety. Vella, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 294.
73. The court did grant the plaintiff leave to replead, in part due to the allegations set
forth in plaintiff's papers opposing defendant's motion to dismiss. Vella, 535 N.Y.S.2d at
294.
74. 548 N.Y.S.2d 513 (App. Div. 1989).
75. In Leibowitz, the plaintiff pleaded several different causes of action against her former employer following the employer's alleged use of religious and ethnic slurs towards her.
retaliatory discharge, harassment (which the court held was actually a claim for wrongful
discharge that could not be maintained by an at-will employee) and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Id. at 515.
The court upheld the lower court's dismissal of the action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress; the concurring opinion stated that the conduct alleged "must consist of
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partment affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's com-

plaint because the defendant's alleged violation of improper billing
did not constitute a substantial and specific danger to the public
health or safety.76
Other whistleblower protection cases have been dismissed for
failing to maintain the "substantial and specific danger to the public
health or safety" requirement based upon ethical and professional
violations.77 In Wieder v. Skala,78 an attorney alleged that he was
terminated because he insisted that the firn report an associate to the
Disciplinary Committee of the Appellate Division of New York for

violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. 79 Similarly, in
Easterson v. Long Island Jewish Medical Ctr.,0 a nurse alleged that
she was wrongfully dismissed after refusing to comply with her
employer's request to disclose the confidential medical records of
another employee without the appropriate authorization;"' thus the
nurse was fired because she would not violate a New York law proscribing "professional misconduct." 2

more than mere insults, indignities, and annoyances." Id. at 522 (Harwood, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
76. The Appellate Division provided a very thorough discussion of both the legislative
history and prior case law regarding the whistleblower statute before aligning itself with the
majority of opinions that have consistently denied employees protection under the statute. Id.
at 516-20.
77. See Littman v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co,, 709 F. Supp. 461, 469 (S.D.N.Y.
1989); Easterson v. Long Island Jewish Medical Ctr., 549 N.Y.S.2d 135 (App. Div. 1989),
appeal denied, 559 N.Y.S.2d 677 (N.Y. 1990); Wieder v. Skala, 544 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct.
1989), afd mem., 562 N.Y.S.2d 930 (App. Div. 1990), afd as modified, 609 N.E,2d 105
(N.Y. 1992); Braig v. The Palace Co., N.Y. LJ., Aug. 3, 1989, at 17 (Sup. Ct. July 16,
1989).
78. 544 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. 1989), aff'd mem., 562 N.Y.S.2d 930 (App. Div. 1990),
affid as modified, 609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1992).
79. Id. at 972.
80. 549 N.Y.S.2d 135 (App. Div. 1989), appeal denied, 559 N.Y.S.2d 677 (N.Y. 1990).
81. Id. at 136. The hospital's policy was not to release employee records until after that
employee signed a consent form. Id.
82. Id. Once again, the court refused to enforce the statute enacted to protect employees
from these situations. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (2)(c) (McKinney 1988). In Easterson, the employee was faced with a lose-lose situation; the court simply read the plain meaning of the
statute without any regard for the consequences to the employee. Easterson, 549 N.Y.S.2d at
136. The court stated that "[e]ven assuming that the disclosure of the medical records was in
violation of the cited provisions of the Education Law and regulations, the defendant's alleged
wrongdoing did not threaten the health or safety of the public at large." Id.
The thrust of the court's argument was that it is fine for an employer to request that
an employee break the law so long as the public at large is not threatened. This case illustrates how imperative it is to widen the scope of protection to employees who report violations of law by their employers. Id.
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The public health or safety limitation has created an auspicious
amount of case law by denying protection to whistleblowers who
reveal employer wrongdoings that fall short of the requirement.83 The
most disturbing and appalling of those decisions was Kern v. DePaul
Mental Health Serv., Inc." In a unanimous decision, the Fourth Department upheld the lower court's dismissal of a claim under the
whistleblower's statute involving a situation that demonstrates the
most obvious need for expanding protection under this statute.8" The
plaintiff believed she had witnessed a rape of a mental patient while
at work; after reporting the matter to the district attorney's office, she
was terminated by the hospital for whistleblowing.86
The Appellate Division agreed with the lower court's decision,
remarking that even if the plaintiff had stated an "actual" violation of
the law, the alleged rape "may have presented a danger to the health
or safety of the individual patient, but did not threaten the health or
safety of the public at large."' This intolerable comment is a classic
illustration of New York courts' refusal to consider the possibility
that whistleblowers may serve the public interest by alerting state or
local officials to serious problems - here the questionable effectiveness of the hospital's security - which, although affecting a single
individual in the lawsuit's context, in reality may affect the wellbeing of many citizens.
Since a hospital is an institution that is supposed to be a safe
environment for patient care, a strong argument can be made that the
rape of a mental patient under this custodial care threatens the health
and safety of the patient and the public. Therefore, the incident created a "substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety,"

83. See, e.g., Remba v. Federation Employment & Guidance Serv., 545 N.Y.S.2d 140
(App. Div. 1989), affd mer., 559 N.E.2d 655 (N.Y. 1990); Leibowitz v. Bank Leumi Trust
Co., 548 N.Y.S.2d 513 (App. Div. 1989); Easterson v. Long Island Jewish Medical Ctr., 549
N.Y.S.2d 135 (App. Div. 1989), appeal denied, 559 N.Y.S.2d 677 (N.Y. 1990); Vella v.
United Cerebral Palsy, 535 N.Y.S.2d 292 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
84. 544 N.Y.S.2d 252 (App. Div. 1989), aff'g 529 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Sup. Ct. 1988), appeal
denied, 549 N.E.2d 151 (N.Y. 1989).
85. Kern, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 252-53. See also supra text accompanying notes 42-47.
86. Id. at 266.
87. Id. at 253. The court stated that the alleged illegalities consisted of neglect of a
patient, failure to report an incident of neglect, improper deletion of an entry concerning such
incident, and an improper attempt to persuade the plaintiff to change her entry of the incident. Id. However, the court held that because it only affected one patient, or perhaps because it concerned only one mental patient, it was not a threat to the health or safety of the
public at large so as to afford statutory protection to the employee for reporting the violation.
Id.
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since the conditions responsible for allowing the alleged rape significantly affect the welfare of other patients and the general public. As
one commentator has pointed out, "[s]urely, a statute that provides no
remedy for an employee who has the courage and moral outrage to
report what she perceived to be a rape is indefensible."88 It is absurd
for the legislature and courts to require or even suggest that the damage reach the level of a national crisis, such as the accident at Three
Mile Island, for whistleblowers to be protected." Harm to one person should be enough.
It is disturbing that New York's whistleblower statute too often
leaves employees who have a good faith belief that an actual violation has occurred, creating a substantial and specific danger to the
public health and safety, unprotected from employer retaliation. This
statute sends a confusing message to employees. On the one hand, the
statute encourages whistleblowing, but on the other hand,
whistleblowers are prevented from taking advantage of this legislative
protection if it is later determined that a reasonable mistake was
made." This statute dictates that whistleblowers must risk their lives
and careers in exchange for absolute uncertainty. The whistleblowers
who were once filled with courage are now unjustly strapped with
fear.
Ill. KRAUS V. NEW ROCHELLE Hosp. MEDICAL CENTER9 1
Kraus represents a landmark ruling in favor of plaintiff's recovery under New York's whistleblower statute. The plaintiff, Barbara
Kraus, claimed that she was terminated by New Rochelle Hospital
Medical Center because she disclosed activities at the hospital which
presented a "substantial and specific danger to the public health or

88. See Feerick, supra note 41, at 589.
89. Givens, supra note 27, at 546.
90. This statute has a perverse attorneys' fee provision that provides that a court, in its
discretion, may order that reasonable attorneys' fees, court costs and disbursements be awarded to an employer if the court determines that an action brought by an employee under this
section was without basis in law or in fact. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(6) (McKinney 1988).
These reverse legal fees provide a sanction against baseless litigation brought to coerce
a settlement or as part of a groundless vendetta against the employer, perhaps initiated because an employee is unhappy over being subjected to adverse action clearly 'predicated' on
unrelated reasons. Feerick, supra note 41, at 7.
Unfortunately, most employees are unable to pay substantial reverse legal fees, and are
often intimidated by fear of losing their life savings. Feerick, supra note 41, at 8.
91. N.Y. LJ., July 29, 1993, at 27 (Sup. Ct. 1993).
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safety."' Prior to the time of her firing, Kraus was Vice President
of Nursing Services. 93
On or about October 14, 1987, nurses from the Intensive Care
Unit reported to Kraus that a doctor had entered that he had performed a surgical procedure called a bronchoscopy on four patients'
charts.' The nurses' concern stemmed from a lack of evidence supporting the fact that the procedures were indeed performed, mainly
because: (1) the nurses were in the Intensive Care Unit continually
monitoring these four patients and never observed the bronchoscopies
being performed; (2) the doctor had failed to advise any of the nurses
that a bronchoscopy had been performed so that the patients reactions
and responses to the procedure could be recorded; (3) there were no
log entries in the hospital's records to indicate that the equipment
needed to perform bronchoscopies had been removed from the Respiratory Unit during the time in question; and (4) the hospital consent
forms to the performance of the bronchoscopy were either not obtained or were of questionable quality. 95
After conducting an investigation, Kraus disclosed to her supervisor what she had learned from the Intensive Care Unit nurses."
Kraus "acted in good faith when she reported to her supervisor what
she reasonably perceived to be unsafe and illegal practices." ' Shortly thereafter, the hospital Medical Board and the Board President ordered an internal investigation by an Ad Hoe Committee." After the
Ad Hoc Committee exculpated the doctor, a Medical Board meeting
was conducted with both the doctor and Kraus present." Following
this meeting, there were rumors that Kraus would be fired."°°
Based upon an anonymous phone call, the State Department of

92.

Ld.

93. Il
94. Id. A bronchoscopy is an inspection of the interior of a bronchus, a bronchoscope is
the instrument used for inspecting the interior of the bronchi for the detection and removal of
foreign bodies. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 195 (24th ed. 1982).

95. Kraus, N.Y. LJ.July 29, 1993, at 27.
96. Id.
97. ld
98. The Ad Hoc Committee consisted of four doctors from the Department of Medicine,
the doctor's department. The Ad Hoc Committee found no wrongdoing on the doctor's part
and criticized Ms. Kraus for her disclosure of allegations to persons other than the Director
of Medicine. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. Additionally, a "Dump Barbara Kraus" sign appeared in the medical lounge,
leading the nursing management group to submit a petition supporting Ms. Kraus and lodge a
formal complaint regarding what they considered the unprofessional conduct and treatment of
Ms. Kraus by the Medical Board. Id.
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Health investigated the bronchoscopies involved in the controversy. 0' Soon thereafter, the Medical Board passed a unanimous vote
of no confidence against Kraus. 2 The court found that the Medical
Board assumed Kraus to be responsible for the anonymous phone call
to the Department of Health. The no confidence vote was published in the hospital's newsletter despite requests from Kraus that it
not be published." 4 As a result, the already-existing tension between
the nursing and medical staff resulting from the incident worsened."
In response to the increased tension, the hospital's Board of
Governors appointed a "Special Review Committee."'" By letter
dated June 6, 1988, Kraus was informed that she was fired."tn Kraus
then brought suit under the whistleblower statute, alleging that she
was fired in retaliation for the information she disclosed to her supervisor.'
The court stated in its decision that "[b]y failing to publicly
disagree with the published no confidence vote and by not publicly
stating that plaintiff was carrying out her responsibility in reporting

the situation, [the hospital] was inferentially adopting the position of
the Medical Board and engaging in retaliatory personnel action."'

The hospital could have easily separated itself from the Medical
Board by stating that it did not agree with the no confidence

vote." o
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. The defendant argued that Kraus' refusal to cooperate with the Special Review Committee was the basis for her termination. Kraus vehemently denied these allegations. Id.
On April 8, 1988, Kraus, accompanied by her attorney, appeared before the Special
Review Committee but declined to answer any questions on advice from counsel, who was
trying to insure that the meeting would not be a guise for pre-trial discovery by defendant.
Ld.Subsequently, the Special Review Committee sought to have Kraus meet them without her
attorney present; however, no such meeting took place. Id.
It is interesting to note that during the first seven weeks of the Special Review
Committee's investigation, it did not meet with Kraus, although it met with numerous other
persons, including some who obviously had little or no information as to why the Medical
Board voted no confidence. Id. at 28. Furthermore, on one occasion, the Special Review
Committee refused Kraus' request for a stenographer. L.
107. Id. at 27.
108. aL
109. lad The hospital's administrators did not publicly support the plaintiff, although they
privately commended her for her courage. Id.
110. Id.
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Relying on these findings, it was the court's opinion that the
plaintiff met her burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliatory action by the employer.' The court then found that the employer did not successfully meet the burden of establishing that Mrs.
Kraus was discharged for an independent, legitimate reason which
was not a pretext for its action."' The relief granted to Mrs. Kraus
consisted of the compensation for lost wages, benefits and payment
by the hospital of reasonable costs, disbursements, and
attorney's fees;
13
however, the court did not grant her reinstatement.

While this decision broke ground for employee protection under
New York's whistleblower statute, it still remains to be seen if other
courts will follow the precedent set by Kraus or continue to enforce

111. See Axel v. Duffy-Mott Co., 389 N.E.2d 1075 (N.Y. 1979) (holding that once an
employee introduces evidence of a retaliatory discharge, the burden may shift to the employer
to prove that the termination was for a legitimate reason independent of such retaliatory
motive); Maloff v. City Comm'n on Human Rights, 387 N.E.2d 1217 (N.Y. 1979) (holding
that when weighed against a prima facie case of sex discrimination, a University's assertion
that an associate professor was a "troublemaker" was not sufficient to meet its burden of
showing an independent legitimate reason to justify her termination); Pace College v. Comm'n
on Human Rights, 339 N.E.2d 880 (N.Y. 1975) (holding that once a prima facie showing of
discrimination has been made, the burden shifts to the employer to show that the employee
was terminated for some independently legitimate reason which was neither pretextual nor
substantially influenced by the discrimination).
112. Once the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case for retaliatory action by the employer, the burden then shifts to the defendant employer to show an alternative reason for the
firing. The court found the following to be true: Kraus' employment record over seven years
indicated that she was "above average" and "capable of advancement"; that until she reported
the conduct at issue to her supervisor, her record was unblemished; that there was no meaningful support in the record for the hospital's proffered explanation of the dismissal - namely, Kraus' lack of cooperation with the Special Review Committee and finally that the
hospital's rationale for Kraus' firing was contrived and pretextual. Kraus, N.Y. L.J., July 29,
1993, at 28.
113. Id. The court determined that past wages amounted to $281,000.00, which was the
difference between what Kraus would have earned if she continued on as Vice-President of
Nursing ($390,200.00) and what she earned during this period ($109,200.00). Id. The court
also granted her past fringe benefits of $70,250.00, future wages of $320,000.00, and future
fringe benefits of $32,000.00, for a total award of $703,250.00. Id.
In an unpublished decision entered by Judge Francis A. Nicolai, August 22, 1994,
Kraus was awarded $587,000.00 in attorneys' fees, a figure that represented 83% of the requested fee. Solo Attorney Gets $587,000 Fee For Work in Whistleblower Action, N.Y. LJ.,
August 29, 1994, at I.
In deciding against granting reinstatement, the court noted that a tension filled and
acrimonious atmosphere existed at the hospital between doctors and plaintiff during the last
months of her employment and that it was highly unlikely that a harmonious working relationship would be established if plaintiff were reinstated to her former position. Although the
court noted that this tension was not the fault of the plaintiff, it felt that this tension would
create an unacceptable risk of detrimental care to the patients. Kraus, N.Y. LJ., July 29,
1993, at 28.
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stringent interpretations of the wording of the statute. However, the
blame for any lack of plaintiff's recovery does not lie solely with the
courts, rather, the fault also lies with the legislature's creation of a
statute that is too narrow and fails to adequately protect

whistleblowers.
IV. AN OVERVIEW OF OTHER STATE WHISTLEBLOWER STATUTES
The imperative need for federal whistleblower protection is demonstrated through the fact that a majority of the states have passed
their own separate laws to protect whistleblowers."' These statutes
share the proposition that violation reporting will be encouraged if
whistleblowers are afforded protection."t 5
State statutes differ regarding which party the whistleblower must
report a suspected violation to in order to be afforded protection.
Many states require a reporting outside the organization to which the
whistleblower belongs." 6 Other state statutes allow the employee to

114. ALASKA STAT. § 39.90.100 (Supp. 1992); AIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-531 to -532
(1985 & Supp. 1993); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5 (West 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
24-50.5-101 to -107 (West 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m (West 1987 & Supp.
1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5115 (1991); FLA. STAT. ch. 112.3187 (1992); HAW. REV.
STAT. §§ 378-61 to -69 (1989 & Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-12-1-8 (,Vest Supp.
1994) and IND. CODE ANN. § 4-15-10-4 (West 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 79.28 (West 1991
& Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2973 (1989 & Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
61.102 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2027 (West 1989 & Supp.
1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 831-40 (West 1988); MD. CODE ANN. art. 64A, §
12G (1988 & Supp. 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 15.361-.369 (West 1994); MINN.
STAT ANN. §§ 181.931-.936 (West 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 105.055 (Vernon 1994); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (1994); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 281.611-.671 (Michie
1990 & Supp. 1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 275-E:1 to -E:7 (Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 34:19-1 to-8 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 126-84 to -88
(1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4413.51 (Baldwin 1988); Okla. Sess. Law H.B.1880 (reported in 7 Individual Empl. Rts. Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 2 (June 2, 1992)); 43 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 1421-28 (1991); R.L GEN. LAWS §§ 36-15-1 to -10 (1990); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 827-10 to -50 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304 (1991); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 67-21-1 to -9 (1986 & Supp. 1993); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 42.40.010-.900
(West 1991); W. VA. CODE §§ 6c-1-1 to -8 (1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 230.80-.89 (West
1987 & Supp. 1993).
115. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-50.5-101 (West 1990). This is not to be
construed as states offering blanket protection to whistleblowers who allege wrongdoings. A
distinction needs to be drawn between the situation where an employee reports a wrongdoing
for the good of the public and suffers retaliation, as opposed to the situation where the employee reports a wrongdoing for the purpose of getting even with a supervisor or just to
fulfill the whistleblower's own personal agenda.
116. Even among the states that require external reporting, there are variations as to
whom the report must be made. Delaware and Washington require reporting to a particular
public office or official. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5115 (1991) (Office of Auditor of Ac-
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disclose either internally or externally; either explicitly by offering an
employee a choice of outlets" 7 or implicitly by not covering the
topic."'
Other state statutes require mandatory disclosure internal9
ly.1

Comparing New York's whistleblower statute to other states'
whistleblower statutes, it is evident that New York fails to provide
the necessary protection to whistleblowers.'2' While New York requires that there be an "actual" violation of law, rule or regulation, 2 1 California' and New Jersey23 only require that the employee have a reasonable belief that an employer has violated the law

counts); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.40.010 (West 1991) (Office of State Auditor).
Florida requires reporting to a public body with authority to take action in response to
the wrongdoing. FLA. STAT. ch. 112.3187 (1992).
Other states more generally require disclosure to a public body. CAL. LAB. CODE §
1102.5 (West 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 378-61 (1985 & Supp. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.362 (vest
1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304 (1991).
117. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2973 (1989 & Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.932
(West 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-85 (1993); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1423 (1991);
W. VA. CODE § 6c-1-3 (1993); WiS. STAT. § 230.81 (1987).
Alaska allows the employer to determine whether the employee makes an internal or
external disclosure by specifying that the employee must report to a public body unless the
employer has required, in a written personnel policy, that the employee first submit to it a
written report. ALASKA STAT. § 39.90.110(c) (Supp. 1992).
118. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5, para. 395/0.01-395/1 (Smith-Hurd 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
105.055 (Vernon 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-902 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
281.611 (Michie Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-27-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
119. In most instances, the required internal report is only the first step. IND. CODE ANN.
§ 4-15-10-4 (West 1991) (first to supervisor or appointing authority, then to anyone); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 833(2) (West 1988) (first to person having supervisory authority
with the employer, then to public body); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-E:2(II) (Supp. 1993)
(first to person having supervisory authority with the employer, after that no specific person
to report to); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-4 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994) (written notice to supervisor first, then to public body.
Some statutes allow an employee to make an external report after giving the employer
a reasonable amount of time to correct the problem. IND. CODE ANN. § 4-15-10-4 (West
1991) (external reporting permitted if a good faith effort is not made to correct the problem
within a reasonable time); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 833(2) (West 1988) (reasonable
opportunity to correct); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-E:2(II) (Supp. 1993) (reasonable opportunity to correct the violation); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-4 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994) (afford the employer as reasonable opportunity to correct); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.52
(Baldwin 1988) (if no good faith effort to correct within 24 hours; only protects
whistleblowing pertaining to criminal offense or imminent risk).
120. See Gary Minda & Katie R. Raab, Unjust Dismissal of Employees At-Will: Are Disclaimers a Final Solution, 15 FoRDHAM URB. . 533, 544 n.82 (1987).
121. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(a) (McKinney 1988).
122. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5(a),(b) (West 1989).
123. See Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-1, 34:19-3
(West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
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in order to be afforded protection from retaliatory discharge. Michigan, 124 Connecticut," and Maine 26 merely require that the employees have a real or suspected belief that a law was violated when
they blow the whistle.
Moreover, these statutes do not restrict the violation reported to
one which endangers the public health and safety, but require only
that the violation affect the public interest." These statutes have the
effect of encouraging employees to come forward and reveal any
illegal employer activities in the workplace. 2 1 It is for these reasons
that New York's whistleblower statute must be reconsidered and
modified to ensure whistleblowers the protection they desperately
need and deserve.
V. AMENDING THE NEW YORK WHISTLEBLOWER STATUTE
This note has addressed several of the major faults in New York
Labor Law § 740. Now it is time to reconsider these problems and
suggest alternative standards that courts should apply when considering employer retaliatory firings.
First, to rectify New York's problems, the requirement in the
statute of a reporting of an "actual" violation must be less strict. It
needs to be modified so that a good faith belief on the part of the
employee will be protected. 29 Too often, employees who have a
good faith belief of a violation of law occurring by their employer
will not come forward with information that might be useful in protecting the public from harm. 3 ° This is due, in large part, to
employees' fear of retaliation by their employers. If the statute under
which whistleblowers are protected were modified, so that employees
who reported a good faith belief violations were protected by statute,
more employees would likely come forward. This would be harmoni-

124. See MICH. COM. LAWS ANN. § 15.362 (West 1994).
125. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m (West 1987 & Supp. 1994) (prohibiting
employer retaliation against an employee "because the employee . . . reports, verbally or in
writing, a violation or a suspected violation of any state or federal law or regulation . . . to
a public body:).
126. See ME. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 831-840 (West 1988) (prohibiting employer
retaliation against an employee who in good faith reports what the employee has reasonably
come to believe is a violation of a law or regulation).
127. See statutes cited supra notes 122-23.
128. Malin, supra note 7, at 1-2.
129. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 15.363-.364 (West 1994).
130. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
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ous with the intended purpose of the statute, 1' i.e. the reporting of
situations that might lead to the harm of the public health and safe32
1

ty.

Second, the statute further requires that the employee report a
suspected violation to a supervisor before external reporting can occur. 3 3 This requirement is not logical if one contemplates the original intended purpose of the statute. If the goal is to prevent the tendency of layers within organizations to screen out potentially embarrassing information,"M then why does the statute require a
whistleblower to make an internal report before reporting the information externally? The statute must be modified so as to align the intended purpose of the statute with the reporting procedure.
Third, the statutory requirement of a violation "creating and
present[ing] a substantial and specific danger to the public health or
safety"' 35 is too narrow in scope. This should be modified so that
more employees will be encouraged to come forward and reveal their
employers' illegal activities regardless of whether they involve public
health or safety. Too often, employees have been denied protection by
the court because they have failed to meet this difficult require"' Employees
ment. 36
should not have to forfeit their protection solely
because the courts do not view the violation to be a danger to
"enough" of the public. 37 Harm to one person, as in Kern, should
be enough to invoke the statute's protection.
Finally, the whistleblower statute must include a provision for
punitive damages against an employer who commits a retaliatory
firing. The present statute, even if it contained the above mentioned
changes, does not create a disincentive for employers who consider
retaliatory firings. A provision allowing for fired employees to recover punitive damages would do just that. It would make an employer
think long and hard before committing a retaliatory firing. In the only
decision to grant an employee recovery on this theory, the court

131. See Givens, supra note 27, at 546.
132. Givens, supra note 27, at 546.
133. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(3) (McKinney 1988).
134. See Givens, supra note 27, at 546.
135. N.Y. LAB. LAw § 740(2)(a) (McKinney 1988).
136. See supra text accompanying note 83.
137. See Kern v. DePaul Mental Health Svcs., 544 N.Y.S.2d 252, 253 (App. Div. 1989)
(holding that even if plaintiff had reported an actual violation, § 740 requirements were not
met because only one hospital patient was affected), appeal denied, 549 N.E.2d 151 (N.Y.
1989).
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awarded past and future earnings,"' but hardly created a situation
where an employer would be discouraged from repeating this behavior. Realizing these limitations, it is clear that the New York
whistleblower statute provides merely the illusion of protection.
Joan Corbo

138.

Nurse is Awarded $703,000 for Retaliatory Firing, N.Y. U., July 29, 1993, at 21.
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